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This experiment examined delayed self-recognition in 24 2.5-year-old and 24 3-year-old 
children. Children were marked covertly with a sticker on their forehead while playing a 
game, after which their photograph was taken. When show this photograph, the 3- but not the 
2.5-year-olds reached to remove this sticker reliably. However, the older children reached 
reliably only when first shown how a recently taken photograph can be used to guide their 
search for an object in the testing room that was not directly visible to the unaided eye. 
Implications of the findings in terms of the development of a temporally extended sense of 





Numerous researchers have used the mirror self-recognition (MSR) task to explore the 
development of self-recognition and mark directed behaviour (Amsterdam, 1972; Bertenthal 
& Fisher, 1978; Bigelow, 1981; Johnson, 1983; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979; Nielsen, 
Dissanayake, & Kashima, 2003; Vyt, 2001). However, when looking into a mirror we are 
confronted with our current self-image; as such, responses to the MSR test do not reflect an 
understanding of one’s self through time (Povinelli, 1995). In order to explore the 
development of a temporally extended sense of self, Povinelli, Landau, and Perilloux (1996) 
developed the delayed self-recognition (DSR) test, which is a delayed analogue of the mirror 
mark test. The test of DSR differs from the test of MSR in that children must recognize an 
image of their self that contains a temporal dimension; whereas a mirror reveals who we are 
in the here and now, a delayed image reveals what we were like some time in the past, be that 
recently in the past or at a time point much further away from the present.  
Whilst both delayed videotapes and photographs of the self have been used in the test of 
DSR (see Povinelli et al., 1996; Skouteris, Spataro, & Lazaridis, in press; Suddendorf, 1999; 
Zelazo, Sommerville, & Nichols, 1999), researchers have predominantly used briefly delayed 
videotapes. In relation to photographs we know that infants are able to discriminate between 
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their own image and another child’s in photographs by 9 months of age (Lewis & Brooks-
Gunn, 1979), and they can recognize their parents’ and their own photographic image from a 
set of photographs by 18 and 24 months of age, respectively (Bigelow, 1981). Infants can also 
label their video and photographic image by about 2 years of age (Bigelow, 1981; Lewis & 
Brooks-Gunn, 1979; Povinelli et al., 1996). However, responses to the question “Who is 
that?” when shown a delayed representation of self, such as a photograph or video 
representation, may not be appropriate measures of self-awareness (Skouteris et al., in press), 
and the ability to label one’s photographic image may not reflect an understanding of the 
self’s continuity through time.  
Povinelli et al. (1996) were the first to use photographs to test for DSR in 3- and 4-year-
old children. In their test of DSR, an experimenter places a large sticker covertly on a child's 
head during a game and a photograph is taken to show the child (with a sticker on their 
forehead), the main experimenter, and a large stuffed toy. Having the experimenter and the 
large stuffed toy in this photograph serves to provide distinct temporal markers for the 
children to understand that the photograph represents a particular moment in the recent past. 
Povinelli et al. argued that if children have developed a temporally extended sense of self they 
should recognise their briefly delayed image in the photograph and reach up to remove the 
sticker when prompted to do so, if not immediately. Only 13% of the 3-year-olds in Povinelli 
et al.’s sample did so. In contrast, almost all of the 4-year-old children reached to remove the 
sticker when shown the photograph. Similar findings were revealed when delayed videotapes 
were used as opposed to photographs. Povinelli et al. concluded that 3-year-old children fail 
the test of DSR because they have a temporally restricted sense of self whereas 4-year-olds 
pass because they have a temporally extended sense of self. 
Given that most 3-year-old children have had lots of experience with photographic 
images of themselves, it may seem surprising that they fail to pass the test of DSR when 
photographs are used. However, researchers have argued that the average 3-year-old appears 
to have difficulty understanding what is represented in this type of delayed representation. 
Flavell, Flavell, Green, and Korfmacher (1990) showed that 3-year-olds were relatively poor 
on photograph tasks that involved predicting whether objects depicted in a photograph would 
fall out if the photograph was inverted or whether people in a photograph could hear the 
experimenter banging on a drum. Surprisingly, 3-year-olds made errors on these tasks even 
when corrective feedback was provided to help them understand that things cannot fall out of 
photographs and people in photographs cannot perceive the “real world” so to speak. Flavell 
et al. argued that children at this age appear to be considering only the actual physical 
properties of the referent and do not take into account the fact that the photograph is a 
representational medium. It is possible that delayed images, such as photographs, present 
conflict for 3-year-olds because what they believe to be true is in fact not true; that is, when 
you tip a “real” (not photographed) uncovered box with things in it upside down, the contents 
are likely to fall out.  
Zaitchik (1990) also argued that when photographic information conflicts with current 
reality, 3-year-old children may rely on what they believe to be true rather than what they see 
in the photograph. Zaitchik used a false belief task to examine children’s beliefs about the 
content of photographs when the referent object was moved after being photographed. Three-
year-old children failed this task consistently even when given probe questions to assist them 
in making early inferences about where the objects were located in relation to when the 
photograph was taken. It appears that 3-year-olds have difficulty retrieving information from 
a photograph to solve a problem that relates to the current state of affairs (such as the location 
of a hidden object) when that delayed representation conflicts with their reality.  
Given that in the test of DSR children do not know that a sticker has been placed covertly 
on their forehead, a photograph revealing such a sticker is in congruence with their perception 
of the present state of affairs. Hence, in order to pass this test children must have two kinds of 
understanding: (1) an understanding that the delayed medium can reveal information about an 
event or object that cannot be seen by the unaided eye, and (2) an understating of the casual 
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connection between their self, as depicted in the recent past, and their present physical self.  
When children acquire the second understanding, Povinelli (1995) argued they have developed 
a “proper self” (p. 167).  The proper self, otherwise known as the temporally extended self, is 
considered a higher order representation of the self that allows children to hold in mind 
multiple and contradictory representations of the self (past, present, and future states) that refer 
to the same entity. According to Povinelli (1995), this system of self-representation, that is 
capable of temporal differentiation, takes over at about 4 years of age and replaces the initial 
system of self-representation, referred to as the “present self”, that is restricted largely to ‘the 
here and now’ (p.165). Povinelli et al.’s (1996) DSR findings accord with this theory as do the 
findings of Povinelli and Simon (1998). Povinelli and Simon also showed that 4- but not 3-
year-old children passed the test of DSR reliably when shown a 3-minute delayed video 
recoding of their marked self image, as opposed to a video recording that was taken one week 
earlier and depicted the child on a completely different day and in a different context.  
In a recent experiment, we provided pre-test video familiarisation to facilitate the first kind 
of understanding and this, we argued, would enable 3-year-old children to show they have the 
second (Skouteris et al., in press). We proposed that the poor performance of 3-year-old 
children in previous DSR experiments was due to a lack of appropriate pre-test training, rather 
than to a restricted sense of self as suggested by Povinelli et al. (1996). We explored Zelazo et 
al.’s (1999) assumption that 3-year-old children’s difficulty in recognising themselves in 
delayed media representations may reflect a more general difficulty in using the video image as 
a spatial referent and, in so doing, questioned Suddendorf’s (1999) conclusion that Povinelli et 
al.’s test of DSR may not be a valid measure of self-awareness.  In our pre-test video 
familiarisation trials an object was hidden in a location of the test room that was not directly 
visible to the child, such as under the table at which the child sat. This “space” in the room was 
not visible to the child’s unaided eye. However, when the videotape was played back, the child 
could see that an object was hidden under the table. By using the video image as a spatial 
referent, the child understood that objects that are not visible directly can still exist. Both 2.5- 
and 3-year-old children passed the pre-test training trials revealing they had no difficulty 
retrieving a hidden object from delayed video footage. Our findings, of both a cross-sectional 
sample and a prospective longitudinal one, also showed clearly that when no pre-test training 
was offered, 2.5- and 3-year-old children were not able to pass the test of DSR. The older 
children passed the test of DSR with little difficulty only when first trained to use the video to 
guide their search for an object that was otherwise not directly visible. In contrast, 2.5-year-old 
children did not reach to remove the sticker from their hair during the test of DSR despite 
receiving such pre-test video training. Whilst we concluded that children younger than 3 years 
of age appear to have a restricted sense of self, we also conceded that further research is needed 
to ascertain whether this is the case. 
The aim of the experiment reported here was to determine whether the successful training 
procedure of Skouteris et al. (in press), with video as the delayed media representation, could 
be applied to photographs as an alternate type of delayed representation. Children aged 2.5 
and 3 years were tested. Previous researchers agreed that it was not until 4 years of age that 
children reliably recognise themselves in delayed representations such as video and 
photographs (Povinelli et al., 1996; Suddendorf, 1999; Zelazo et al., 1999). Our previous 
findings have shown that not to be the case and support Zelazo et al.’s (1999) assumption that 
3-year-old children’s difficulty in recognising themselves in delayed media representations 
may reflect a more general difficulty in using the delayed image as a spatial referent. Our first 
hypothesis was based on Skouteris et al.’s conclusion that 3-year-old children appear to have 
a more mature proper self than argued by Povinelli (1995, 2001).  Consequently, we predicted 
that if children at this age were first trained to understand that a photograph can show an 
object on one’s self that is situated in a location that is otherwise not visible to them (i.e., on 
their hair) they would reach up to remove the sticker during the test of DSR significantly 
more often than children who were not given such pre-test training.  Alternatively, in 
accordance with Povinelli et al.’s (1996) findings, if 3-year-old children do not have an 
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extended sense of self, DSR performance should be poor and should not differ statistically 
across the photograph training and no training conditions.   
With respect to the 2.5-year-old children, if they have a restricted sense of self as 
suggested by Skouteris et al. (in press), pre-test training with photographs should not facilitate 
their DSR performance. In contrast, given that most 2.5-year-olds have had substantial 
experience with photographs, and understand that a photograph is a symbol that stands for 
something (DeLoache, 1991), it is possible that with the appropriate pre-test training children 
younger than 3 years will appreciate the causal link between recently delayed and present self 
images in a photograph. If the latter hypothesis is supported, the claim that 2.5-year-old 





The participants comprised 24 2.5-year-old children and 24 3-year-old children 
recruited from the Child Development Registry at La Trobe University. The children were 
predominantly Caucasian and from middle class families living in the Northern suburbs of 
Melbourne, whose parents gave informed written consent for their participation. The children 
in each age group were divided at random into two groups: no training condition: (6 girls, 6 
boys; M age = 30.17 months, SD = 1.64 months) and (7 girls, 5 boys; M = 37.08 months, SD 
= 2.78 months), for the 2.5- and 3-year-olds, respectively; training condition: (5 girls, 7 boys; 
M age = 30.25 months, SD = 1.42 months) and (4 girls, 8 boys; M age = 37.58 months, SD = 
2.68 months), for the 2.5- and 3-year-olds, respectively. An additional five children were 
tested; one 3-year-old and two 2.5-year-olds discovered the sticker prior to the test of DSR 
and two of the younger children did not complete the testing session due to fussiness. These 
children were not included in the final sample. A parent remained with their child during the 
entire testing session. 
 
Materials 
The room used for testing was 4.07m x 3.40m, with a beige floor-to-ceiling curtain 
covering the entire wall to the left of the experimental table and three colourful children’s 
posters on the wall to the right.  The experimental setting consisted of a small table for testing 
(113cm long x 50cm wide x 42cm high) and a small chair for seating the participants. This 
table was positioned in the middle of the room, with the child’s chair facing away from the 
curtain covering the left wall. A chair for the child’s mother was positioned behind and 
slightly to the right of the child’s chair so that she was out of the child’s sight but her image 
was visible in the photographs that were taken as part of the test of DSR. A mirror (59cm high 
x 37cm wide) was required to test participants who did not pass the test of DSR. In both the 
training and no training conditions six coloured plastic cups were required (each 10.5cm high 
with a base diameter of 9.5cm) under which the experimenter hid six toy animals. A colourful 
box was located on the floor just in front of the table at which the child sat. The children 
could not see this box when they were seated at the table. One square fluorescent yellow 
sticker (approximately 4.5cm square) was placed on each participant’s head in the DSR 




No training condition. The experimenter sat on one side of the table to be close to the 
child during this condition. The session was introduced as a game of ‘hide and seek’ in which 
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the experimenter would hide six toy animals under six different coloured cups. The animals 
and the cups were removed systematically from a colourful box that was next to the table at 
which the children sat and placed onto the table in front of the children. While the children 
were watching, each animal was hidden under one of the coloured cups, until all animals were 
hidden. The children were then asked to find one of the animals. If the children did not choose 
the correct cup they were encouraged to keep searching until the animal was found. When the 
animal was found the child was given praise in the context of having his hair ruffled; hence 
the proximity of the experimenter to the child. The hair was ruffled at this time to habituate 
the children to being touched on their foreheads, thus enabling, the experimenter to place a 
sticker there covertly during the marking procedure (see description below).  This procedure 
was continued for another two animals that were hidden.     
Training condition. In this experimental condition children were told that one of the toy 
animals (the toy was pointed out) was to be hidden somewhere in the room. The child was 
shown the Polaroid camera and was told that this camera took special pictures that would at 
first be invisible but would then show the child where a toy was hidden in the room. They 
were then asked to cover their eyes whilst the experimenter hid the animal in a cup or box that 
was hidden in a location that was not directly visible to the children in “real time” (i.e., in a 
cup under the table at which the children sat, in a colourful box in front of the table at which 
the children sat, and in a cup behind the curtain covering the left wall). The experimenter took 
a photograph of the toy next to the hiding place before actually hiding it (e.g., the toy was 
photographed next to the box before being placed into the colourful box). The photograph 
was taken from the front corner of the room to ensure that the child, the mother, the table at 
which the child sat, the colourful box and the curtain behind the child could all be seen in the 
photograph. The children were asked to watch while the photograph developed. This took 
approximately two minutes. The experimenter then pointed out the toy in the photograph and 
told the children that the photograph revealed where she had hidden the toy while their eyes 
were covered; at that point they were encouraged to locate the hidden toy. A correct response 
required the children to locate the hidden animal without prompting. If they could not locate 
the toy, the experimenter pointed the location out again in the photograph and gave the child 
another chance to find the toy. As with the no training condition, when the animal was found 
the child was given praise in the context of having his or her hair ruffled. In order to 
participate in the DSR testing, children were required to locate the hidden animal without 
prompting on at least two of three training trials. All of the children met this requirement. 
 Marking procedure. In the training condition, the marking procedure involved hiding the 
toy animals under cups that were placed on the table at which the children sat, whilst they 
shut their eyes. The children were once again encouraged to look for the hidden toys and after 
the fourth toy animal was found a sticker was covertly placed on their hair, just above the 
forehead. The experimenter then told the children that they were so good at finding all the toy 
animals that a photograph would be taken showing them with their toys. A photograph of 
each child, with the sticker clearly visible on their forehead, was taken; this photograph 
showed the mother sitting behind her child and depicted the cups and toy animals on the table 
at which the children sat. The mother and toy cups served as distinct temporal markers to 
facilitate the child’s understanding that the photograph depicted what just happened 3 minutes 
prior. 
The marking procedure for the no training condition was identical to that described for 
the training condition. However, given that the children were already playing the hide and 
seek game with toy animals being hidden under one of the cups on the table, the experimenter 
conducted a fourth trial and on this occasion when the child found the toy they were covertly 
marked with a sticker on their forehead as opposed to having their hair ruffled. The three 
children who discovered the sticker inadvertently prior to testing of DSR were excluded from 
the final sample. 
Test of DSR. After the marking procedure the children watched while the photograph 
developed and were then asked four questions: “Who is that?” while the experimenter pointed 
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to the child in the photograph, “What is that?” while the experimenter pointed to the sticker, 
and “Where is the sticker really? Can you get it for me?” These questions were almost 
identical to the ones used by Povinelli et al. (1996). The index of DSR was whether the 
children reached up to locate the sticker on their head. The experimenter scored the response 
of each child during the test session. 
Mirror self-recognition. If a child did not reach up to remove the sticker during DSR, that 
child was tested for MSR. The same four questions were asked in the test of MSR.  
In order to ascertain whether children have had experience with photographs, each mother 
was asked to report on her child’s exposure to this medium. Not surprisingly, all mothers 
reported that their child had previous experience with photographs and substantial exposure to 




The dependent variable was whether or not children reached up to the sticker on their 
head during the test of DSR. A second experimenter observed the testing session of 16 
children (four from each condition). Inter-rater reliability on reaching/not reaching for the 
sticker and on the type of verbal response given to the question “Who is that?” was 100%. 
The number of 2.5- and 3-year-old children demonstrating DSR in both the training and 
no training conditions is shown in Table1.   
 
Table 1: Number of 2.5- and 3-year-old Children Exhibiting Delayed Self-recognition (DSR) 
in each of the Two Conditions: Pre-Test Photograph Training and No Training. 
 
2.5-year-olds 3-year-olds  Condition Yes No Yes No 
Training          4             8         10        2  
No Training          3           9           4         8   
            
 
 
A 2 (training or no training) X 2 (DSR or no DSR) chi-square analysis was carried out to 
examine the relationship between training on DSR for 2.5- and 3-year-old children. Training 
did not facilitate DSR in 2.5-year-olds, (Fisher exact test, p = .50). In contrast, a significant 
relationship between training and DSR was demonstrated for 3-year-old children (Fisher 
exact test, p = .02). More children in the training condition reached for the sticker than 
children in the no-training condition. All of the children (both 2.5- and 3-year-olds) who did 
not display DSR passed the test of MSR. 
Children’s verbal responses to the question “Who is that?” are shown in Table 2. All 
children used either their proper name or “me”. A 2x2 chi square analysis revealed a non-
significant relationship between age and verbal response used, x2 (1) = 0.87; p > .05.  The 
younger and older children did not differ in their use of self-reference phrases. 
In relation to responses given to the question “Who is that?” as a function of task 
performance, 9 (42.9%) and 7 (37%) of the children who passed and failed the DSR test, 
respectively, responded with their first name, as opposed to “me”. A chi square analysis 
revealed a non-significant relationship between DSR performance and verbal measures of 
self-recognition, x2 (1) = 0.67; p >.05.   
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Table 2: Frequencies of Verbal Labelling of Delayed Self-Image Across the Two Age 
Groups. 
 
Verbal Labels AGE “Me” Proper Name 
2.5 years 10 14 






As expected, 3–year-old children reached up to remove the sticker from their forehead 
when first given the appropriate pre-test training with photographs. However, despite the 
exposure young children have with photographs, the causal connection between one’s briefly 
delayed self-representation and current reality was not obvious to 3-year-old children when 
they were untrained prior to the test of DSR, even though there was no secrecy surrounding 
the fact that their photograph was taken and the sticker on their forehead was pointed out to 
them. This latter finding concurs with that reported by Povinelli et al. (1996). In contrast, 3- 
year-olds were able to use information from a photograph to retrieve a hidden toy, as was also 
the case in Skouteris et al. (in press) when video was used as the delayed medium.  
Our findings suggest that by 3 years of age children understand that their self moves 
through time, in so far as they can respond to a briefly delayed image of themselves and 
remove a sticker that has been placed covertly on their forehead. This finding does not 
support the findings of Povinelli et al. (1996), who also used photographs in the test of DSR, 
nor does it support the findings of Suddendorf (1999) and Zelazo et al. (1999) who showed 
that 3-year-olds perform poorly in the test of DSR when video recordings are used. Whilst 
Povinelli et al. and Povinelli and Simon (1998) argued that 3-year-old children may develop a 
less sophisticated form of the proper self that enables them to hold in mind different states of 
self (past, present, and future) but does not enable them to bind these different states over 
time, our findings suggest that 3-year-olds may indeed have a more mature proper self. It 
appears that a lack of pre-test training may have masked this maturity in previous research 
examining DSR performance in children of this age; when pre-test training was provided to 
facilitate 3-year-old children’s understanding that delayed representations can reveal 
information about an event or object that cannot be seen by the unaided eye, they passed the 
test of DSR.  
Our findings showed clearly that 2.5-year-olds performed poorly on the test of DSR in 
both the pre-test training and no training conditions. We were not surprised by this finding 
given our previous research with children of this age (Skouteris et al., in press). We were also 
not surprised by the finding that 2.5-year-olds have the representational capacity to pass 
photograph object retrieval-tasks that are not specific to the self, as was required in the pre-
test training. This finding is in line with two recent studies by Suddendorf (2003) and Troseth 
(2003) who showed that even 24-month-olds have this ability. Furthermore, this finding is in 
line with DeLoache’s (1991) research that showed 2.5-year-olds were able to find a hidden 
toy in a large room when shown a photograph of a scale model of that room. In contrast, it 
appears that 2.5-year-old children do not have the representational capacity to solve a 
retrieval problem based on delayed self-information. Despite the fact that the younger 
children were trained successfully to use information from a photograph to retrieve a hidden 
toy, they could not use this source of information to guide their search of the sticker in their 
hair. This finding suggests that success on the DSR task may require a more advanced level of 
representational insight than object-retrieval tasks.  
According to Suddendorf (1999), children who have not developed metarepresentational 
thinking might pass the task of DSR by matching features from the delayed image to current 
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reality. Whilst this might be the case, Povinelli (2001) argued that the most salient aspect of 
one’s present self-representation is kinaesthetic information. Given that photographs do not 
provide such kinaesthetic information, Povinelli reasoned that children without a developed 
proper self will conclude, more often than not, that the image in the is not the same as 
themselves and hence not reach for the sticker. We have shown this to be the case with 2.5-
year-olds in several experiments now (in two experiments in Skouteris et al. (in press), and in 
the experiment here). Interesting, the children who did not reach for the sticker were able to 
label their delayed image correctly by using either their proper name or saying “me”. As our 
findings revealed though, responses to the question “Who is that?” may not be appropriate 
measures of self-awareness because there was no association between the type of label used 
by the children in response to their delayed image and performance on the DSR task. In 
accordance with Smiley and Huttenlocher (1995), it appears that the use of a proper name is 
as much an index of self-recognition as is the use of a first person pronoun.        
 Povinelli (2001) also argued that if children have developed a proper self, reaching for 
the sticker during the test of DSR should be reliable. As with the unreliable reaching of 2.5-
year-olds, we have shown this reliable reaching in 3-year-olds in several experiments now (in 
two experiments in Skouteris et al. (in press), and in the experiment here); this reliable 
reaching occurs only when 3-year-olds are first provided with the appropriate pre-test 
training. If, overall, children were responding to the featural equivalence of the delayed image 
and their present self then a difference in reaching behaviour between 2.5- and 3-year-old 
children should not have been revealed, especially given that both the 2.5- and 3-year-olds 
here had no problem retrieving a hidden object from photographic information provided to 
them in the training trials.  
Whilst the present findings and those of Skouteris et al.’s (in press) study revealed that 
children of both ages, 2.5 and 3 years, had no difficulty retrieving a hidden object from 
photographs or from delayed video footage, the pre-test training trials in either of these studies 
did not involve a “surprise”. Children were told clearly by the experimenter that one of the toy 
animals was to be hidden somewhere in the room and that the photograph or video footage 
would help them to locate that hidden object. It is possible, therefore, that the pre-test training 
primed the children to look for a hidden object3. In contrast, the sticker placed on the child’s 
hair during the DSR task was done so covertly; as such the child was not primed to expect to 
look for a hidden object on self when shown their delayed self-image. Whereas the older 
children were able to transfer from the pre-test training that involved priming to the test of DSR 
that did not involve priming, the 2.5-year-old children could not.  It is possible that 2.5-year-
olds needed additional pre-test training to perform the DSR task successfully, such as delayed 
self-image experience. Indeed, Troseth (2003) showed that giving 2-year-old children extensive 
experience with their live self image facilitated their performance on a live object-retrieval task, 
a task that had traditionally only been passed by 2.5-year-olds (Troseth & DeLoache, 1998). 
Future research should explore this possibility4. 
In conclusion, our findings suggest that 2.5-year-old children can make inferences about 
objects in space (i.e., a toy hidden somewhere in the room) before they can make inferences 
about an object on their own bodies (i.e., a sticker on my hair) when using delayed 
representations and that their difficulty with the latter task may arise because of a restricted 
sense of self. We argue that changes in DSR performance from unsuccessful, at the age of 2.5 
years, to successful, at 3 years of age, may be due to the transition from a present to a proper 
self. While Povinelli (1995, 2001) described this transition he may have underestimated the 
age at which a mature proper self emerges.  
 
 
                                                 
3 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this point. 
4 Unpublished data in our laboratory has shown that delayed self-image experience in addition to pre-
test training does not facilitate DSR performance in 2.5-year-old children. 
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